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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1; IE STATE BANK, 
'/S. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
KIRK BRACKEN and LINFORD 
'J,ACKEN, 
Defe!1dants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 19375 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 19, 1979, the respondents, as co-obligors, 
executed an installment promissory note in favor of the 
appellant bank, in the amount of $7,695, said note bearing 
interest at 1-±% per annum. (R 112 ~l) The respondents also 
executed a security agreement giving the appellant a se-
cur1ty interest in a 1979 Ford pickup truck. The install-
ment note and security agreement both contained an attor-
ney's fee provision, providing for the payment of a "reason-
1ble 11 attorney's fee in the event of default. (R 4, 6, 112 
' 1 ) . 
The respondents made four payments on said obliga-
tion, the last payment being made in the month of January, 
195~. (R 112 ~2). 
1 
The truck, collateral for the lean, was lawf. 
repossessed on July 2 5, 1981, and sold to the respcr.: 
Kirk Bracken at public sale pursuant to notice. (R 113 • 
7 and 8). 
The 3ppe:.i.a~t there3fter, b1cught su1• 
deficiency on the note in the amount of S3,'358.8-t an-J 
costs and attorney's fees. (R 1-3). 
The resp:mdents filed a motion to dismiss 
compla,;,nt, ;:rnrst:2r.·~ to Rule l.2!b)("' :J.R.C.?. The 2cch 
filed an opposing affidavit and memorandum, and subsPqu!~. 
appeared in the District Court to contest this motion, ·-in.· 
motion was subsequently denied. (R 11-29, 36-H) . 
• 0.fter the t:cial court's c:enial of mo ti en t.: ~:::· 
miss, ( R ·±1) the respondents answered the complaint a:. 
·:01,nter-claimed for 5205,000, claiming wrongful reposse 0 -
>oL:Jll, damage to the respondents' c1·edi t reputation ire ·: 
Junction with the repossession of the vehicle and fer v.: · 
tive damages. (R 42-45, 113) 
On April 1-±, 1982, the appellant noticed the jei:· 
si tions of respondent Kirk Bracken and Bernice Bracken, :;., 
wife. Said depositions were taken on May 10, 1982. (R 5t 
On May 19, 1982, the appellant requested an i1nnk 
diate tria.i. setting and gave notice of its readiness : 
trial. ( R 58, 59). 
On May 2 9, 1982, the respondents ob J ected t · 
request for immediate trial setting, stating that they .:. 
desired to take the 
Murra:/ Gubler, two of 
depositions of 
the appei.lant' s 
'111111 am Hick.man a:· 
officers. (R 
2 
Thereafter, on July 14, 1982, the respondents took 
d deposition, but only of Mr. Hickman, which deposition was 
:leiended by the appellant's counsel, Mr. Hughes. (R 140) 
On the 25th day of August, 1982, the trial Court 
set the matter for a non-jury trial on September 21, 1982. 
Two weeks later, on September 10, 1982, the respondents 
again moved to continue the trial setting re-stating their 
cJes1re set forth in May of 1982, to take the deposition of 
1.~r Gubler. (R 66, 72) Respondents also demanded a jury 
trial. 
(R 68) 
As the trial had been set and the Court had not 
ruled on the respondents' motion, the appellant appeared in 
':.he District Court on September 21, 1982, ready for irrune-
diate trial. The trial Court, however, granted the respon-
dents' motion to continue despite appellant's protestations 
that the motions were not timely, as local court procedure 
did not, as a practical matter, provide for such a quick 
impaneling of a jury, and that the respondents' grounds for 
continuance were largely the same as those expressed months 
earlier in May of 1982. (R 72). 
After this continuance, the deposition of Murray 
'~;ubler was taken on October 6, 1982 and defended by appel-
lant's counsel Mr. Hughes. (R 141). 
Jury trial was then re-set for May 11, 1983. (R 
3 
Pursuant to the pleadings of the par'..1c·,, 
discovery, and primarily because the responden".s' ;1 ,1 .• 
quested a jury trial, the appellant's counsel prepC1red 
instructions covering issues raised by both tile ·rri 1 ~ 
and counter-claim. (R 86, 114 'I 12, 13, P 32) 
On the afternoon of Monday, May 9, 1983, Jus': 
days before trial, respondents' counsel advised the a~~­
lant' s counsel that the respondent did not des1rp to pr: 
with JUry trial. IT 2: 15-3: 7, R 114 ~ l=) By this .. 
however, appellant's counsel had already prepared 
instructions' and other preparations for trial had re-
completed. ( R 11-± ~ 12, 21:6-16) 
stipulated, on the date of the tr:..al, that ]111:; tria. 
not necessary. ( R 83) Respondents' late withdrawal 
their earlier request for a jury became clear when tr.e:. 
counsel testified that he had not, at any rate. l".ver c:•· 
pared Jury instr~ct1ons. (T 32: 3- 7 ) 
At the initiation of trial, the parties st1pula:2: 
to three items: One, that appellant take Judgment ~gal"' 
the respondents on its complaint for 54,748.39; two, :'.·, 
the counter-claim be dismissed with prejudice; and th:e' 
that the remaining issue of appellant's attorney's fees 
submitted on testimony to the trial court for a decis1r.r 
84, T 15: 9-25, 16: 2) 
The appellant's counsel testified that the 
of his time spent in prosecuting the plaint.:. ff' s cas" 
defending against the 5205,000.00 counter-claim was 54, 
(T 21:16-19, 22: 23-23:2). 
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The lower court, thereafter, entered judgment for 
1p~,ellant in the principal sum of 54, 748.39 and an addi-
'..1onal Sl,500 for attorney's fees. (R 115 '1 2, R 117) 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
·:;e :rial court specifically found that $4,747.50 for an 
3ttorney' s fee 'das a "reasonable fee", and in fact, found 
that such a fee "adequately represents the necessary time 
3;:J preparation for the case." (R 114 <115, emphasis added.) 
Preli~inary to this finding, and as a basis there-
~:re, the trial Court significantly found that the matter 
had been set for trial two times, and in each instance the 
cppellant was ready to go forward but that respondents had 
:'co:·~ajed the trial by their requests tc impanel a jury and 
t3!(e additional discovery. ( R 113 ~9) The court likewise 
hund that the several depositions taken were reasonable, 
rnd 3lso that the Jury instructions prepared by the appel-
l3nt's counsel and received as evidence by the Court were 
2lso a factor in determining the attorney's fees, and were 
reasonable and necessary under the premises. (R 113 11 10; 
114 H3, 14) 
After carefully making these initial findings, the 
Court found as follows: 
The amount of the attorney's fees claimed of 
$4, 74 7. SO, though reasonable in all regard, con-
sti ti tute a sum approximating the debt due on the 
note, absent any assessment for the attorney's 
fees and from the testimony and the file, the 
Court finds Sl,500 a reasonable fee to be assessed 
against the defendants. (R 115 '!18). 
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The trial court's comments to counsel expiair 
the court found on the one hand that $4, 7 4 7. 5 O was a 1 "~' 
able fee, but then awarded only $1,500. The court 
We have reached a point in this soc1et-;, 
many members of the public, that we all won t 
believe that the law is for those who can aE£. 
it. The Court would find the fees must have -
reasonable relationship to the amount that :a·.~' 
gained, or whatever could potentially be l·)St 
34:16-20). 
Recognizing the seeming inconsistency rn f;:, 
finding that a fee of $4,747.50 was reasonable and then0~,: 
awarding $1,500 for an attorney's fee, the trial 
encouraged the filing of this appeal, stating: 
Again, I encourage you both to take it on appea. 
I think it is a case that should be addressed '· 
the Supreme Cou.::-t of the State of Utah, ·c. 
respect to fees. I have indicated that I t!;: .. · 
the subject should have some attention :o !·' 
guidelines to lawyers in s:i.milar law suits. (c 0 
14-18). 
The appellant thereafter appealed the Judgment 
the district court to this Court in order to dete:-~c· 
whether the trial court properly awarded attorney's fees 
light of the evidence and explicit contrary findings made 
the Court. 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF A REDUCEL ATTORNEY' 5 FEE 
BASED SOLELY ON THE COURT'S FINDING THAT AN AWAPL 0'.,". 
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT APPROX IM.ATE THE AMOUNT Of lr~­
APPELLANT' S RECOVERY WAS A CLE.'l.R ABUSE OF DISCRETJ:N 
6 
,)11 May 11, 1983, Michael D. Hughes, attorney for 
':,e cippellant, test1f1ed that a reasonable attorney's fee in 
case was 54,747.50. The parties had previously stipu-
l;1ted that the appellant was to have Judgment for $4, 748.39 
and that the respondents' counter-claim would be dismissed 
·.;l(L preJudice. Mr. Hughes catalogued, for the trial court, 
~ ~=·:.ns and labor undertaken in prosecuting the appel-
lant's claim for a deficiency and in defending a $205,000 
c'.'unter·claim. This recital included testimony that the 
.~pell3nt had defended motions, taken and defended depo-
··c c~nducted research, twice prepared for trials that 
,,ere c:ont1 nueG by the respondents' motions, and prepared 
JUlY i11struct1ons only after the respondents had demanded a 
Mr. Miles, attorney for respondents, testified 
'.!:at · r his opinion a reasonable fee for the appellant's 
~or~ was $2,000 (T 28:4-10) Mr. Miles opinion was based not 
H\ what effort the appellant's counsel had expended, but 
!other what fees he, Mr. Miles, had charged his client for 
n1s own work on the case, which fees had been substantially 
r,,;•iuced by a "rebate" Mr. Miles had given his client. (T 28: 
. >23) 
The trial court, having all of the appellant's 
~fforts well in mind, specifically found that the fees 
.:1ars;od by the appellant's attorney were reasonable and 
· 0 c~ssary in light of what the appellant was required to do 
7 
and what it was facing. (R 11--±~15) The lowe1 .::ou1t 
ever, refused to award S.Jo.~"i'.50 to :he ,1~·pelLrnt: f._ 
ney' s fees, even though the cou1 t r.a::! found tna t t:1-" ..• 
were reasonable and necessary. because it fr~·und that '~ .. 
sum approximated the appellant's Judgment of S"i, ~"i::: 0 • 
Thereafter, the lower court awarded only Sl. S~O f.r 3~: 
ney's fees which was less than one-third the amount wh: 
the trial court had otherwise found reasonabl", an'.l e .. ~:. 
lower than respondents' counsel's own testimony as :c 
reasonable award for appellant's attorneys fees. -:'hus. 
incongruously, the lower court's award was substantia.i 
less than what either attorney had t"stifie1 to ~s be:~c 
reasonable on appe~lant's behalf. 
The initial issue to be decided by this Court 
whether the trial court, having found $4,747.50 to be a 
reasonable attorney's fee, can thereafter award onl·· 
on the theory that an award of attorney's fees sho~Lj 
approximate the recovery obtained. 
It has long been the rule in this 1urisdict1on 
that a trial court's award of attorney's fees will not te 
disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Ale~ 
ander ·1. Brown 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982); Beckstrom -vs. 
Beckstrom 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978). The appellant urges 
that the trial court abused its discretion in awardinJ 
Sl,500 in view of its finding that $4,'747.50 was reasuna• 
and the testimony of both appellant's and respondents' 
attorneys that a greater fee was in order. (T 21:16-lq 
23, 23: 2, T 28: ll-23J 
8 
In Bermes v. Sylllng, 583 P. 2d 377 (Mont. 1978) 
":,, M_,ntciria Sui:;reme Court, citing First Security Bank v. 
:·1Cc'-1c<S.~ 547 P.2d 1328 (Mont. 1976), listed several factors, 
-~·ch that Court believed ought to be considered in deter-
'"1:11r:q .~ fee award. The Court stated: 
The circumstances to be considered in determining 
the compensation to be recovered are the amount 
cind character of the services rendered, the labor, 
time cind trouble involved, the character and 
importance of the litigation in which the services 
were rendered, the amount of money or the value of 
property to be affected, the professional skill 
cind experience called for, the character and 
standing in their profession of the attorneys. 
The result secured by the services of the attorney 
~ay be considered as an important element in 
determining their value. Bermes, supra, at 387. 
The factors described by the Bermes Court, clearly 
L·. tows the factors set out in the 1976 version of the ABA' s 
Code of Professional Responsibility. Disciplinary Rule 
2-:,)6\S), states as follows: 
Factors to be considered as guides in determining 
the reasonableness of a fee include the following: 
1) The time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the 
skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly. 
2) Likelihood, if apparent to the client, that 
the acceptance of the particular employment will 
perclude other employment by the lawyer. 
3) The fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services. 
4) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
51 The time limitations inposed by the client, or 
the circumstances. 
9 
6) The nature and length of tne profess 1 • 
relationship with the client 
: ) The experience, reputation, ar.d ati~: t·· 
lawyer or lawyers performing the services. 
8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
The appellant believes that the trial court shc·J: 
have considered these factors, but did not. Cert a1nly L~.-
amount in controversy ought to be considered as a rele·:, · 
factor in determining ·,;hat is a reasonable oittorney'c ;,, 
However, the appellant strenuously asserts that na·. 
determined that the $4,747.50 was a reasonable fee, ,.. 
trial court ought not to spin off the single factor Jf 
facts of the case and the circumstances which caused the :c' 
to be incurred. 
In Nelson v. Tn1J illo, 657 P. 2d 730 (Utah p3; 
the Utah Supreme Court held tnat a district court had ec:c· 
in ordering a remi tti tur on the basis of alleged miscond.'. 
of plaintiff's attorney, since the Judge had specif1ca, .. 
found that the damages were reasonable and not excess1··' 
In short, Nelson holds that the trial court could not on 
hand find an award of damages not excessive and then ordec 
rem1ttitur on some other basis; a prerequisite to remi'' 
tur being a finding of an excessive award. By analog .. 
finding that the requested award is unreasonable should t, 
prerequisite to the exercise of the trial court's discreL 
to reduce an attorney's fee. In this case, the trial cc:. 
specifically found the requested award to be reasonaLc 
10 
-rpellant is unaware of any authority to reduce an award of 
"•ttorney' s fees for the sole reason that the award requested 
•he1~1se approximates the monetary recovery. 
In John Deere Company v. Catalano, 525 p. 2d 1153 
(Colo. 1974), the appellant argued that an award of $1,500 
was excessi~e as a matter of law, because the award exceeded 
the amount of the underlying deficiency judgment of $1,300.59. 
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the proposition that an 
attorney's fee could not exceed the amount of recovery, 
stating that there was "no authority" for such a proposi-
t1cn. Id. at 1157. Similarly, this Court should also reject 
~~.e pos1 tion taken by the lower court in the instant case 
•;:,, ~ 0tn attorney's fee cannot approximate the prevailing 
party's recovery. Simply stated, such a proposition is bad 
~aw and bad public policy because it ignores several re-
2ognized factors in determining the fee award, and unduly 
isolates and emphasizes but one factor. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals in Zambruk v. 
Perlmutter 3rd Generation Builders, 510 P. 2d, 472 (Colo. 
App. 1973), stated as follows: 
The purpose of a provision for attorney's fees is 
to indemnify the creditor of the prevailing party 
against the necessity of paying an attorney's fee 
and to enable him to recover the full amount of 
the obligation. 
In Management Services Corporation v. Development 
;ssoc1ates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980), this Court, in a case 
-~ which a respondent requested attorney's fees for success-
fuEy defending an appeal, approved the "indemnity" doctrine 
11 
of the Zambruk case stating that indemnifying a pr en i J:' 
party was "the most cogent reason for allowing of such 
on appeal." Id. at 409. 
The Management Services Corporation propc. 01 :. 
that contractual attorney's fees clauses are meant to "i 
der.mify" a prevailing party is grossly emaciated if t:.• 
lower court's position that fees cannot approximate recovr· 
is allowed to stand. Such a position unduly narrows tt.: 
factors which courts ought to be focusing upon to detem;~ 
a fee award, and undermines the policy of ::.• 
Management Services Corporation case and the other authcc 
ties cited. The practical result of accepting the lcwv 
court's position would be that many litigants seelung srna. 
recoveries will not be able to be indemnified. Vind1cat;.: 
of wrongs and protection of rights, with the expectation 
being made whole, then becomes a privilege of the 11tiga:.: 
who has a large recovery, and a sham to litigants ";~. 
smaller recoveries obtained only after protracted 11 t1gat;:· 
with a recalcitrant party. Indeed, the policy itself e:. 
courages recalici tr ant parties to unduly protract 11 tigat:: 
with relative impunity regarding fees for the preva1l 1~: 
party, particularly where the prevailing party, as ~ 
sought a modest, good faith recovery. On the other hand, 
a litigant were to abuse an attorney's fee clause to 
ficially inflate the recovery or force settlement. 
matter could be dealt with through speci fie findings or 
extreme cases, through rlisciplinary action. 
ever, this is not the case here. 
12 
Clearly, he'· 
The appellant does not contend that the lower 
.·Jctrt lacks the discretion to reduce the amount of attor-
r1ey' s fees to something less than that testified to by the 
1ppellant's attorney, Mr. Hughes. Clearly, if the court had 
found, on admissible testimony, that the fees were unreason-
able, or that the equities of the case were against the 
pre'1ail1ng party, then the court might reduce the award to a 
"reascl'.atle extent." Arnold Machinery Company, Inc.v. 
Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 246, 357 P.2d, 496 
( 1960). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has decided a number 
of cases, in which the trial Court had exercised its dis-
cretion to deny or reduce attorney's fees. See 
.O.lexander v. BrC>wn, SUfra,; Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d, 606 
(Utah 1976); American Gypsum Trust v. Georgia Pacific 
Coq:ioration, 512 P. 2d 658 (Utah 1973); Fireman's 
Insurance Com.12anv v. Brown, 529 p .2d, 419 (Utah 1974); 
Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, su.12ra; and Arnold Machinery 
Inc. v. Intrustion Pre.12akt Inc., su.12ra. In each of these 
~ases, however, this Court has been careful to note that the 
lower court's discretion to deny or reduce attorney's fees 
lS not unlimited. See Arnold Machinery Com.12any vs. 
Intrusion Pre.12akt Inc., 11 Utah P. 2d 246, 357 2d 496 
( 1960). Thus, in each case, in which this Court upheld a 
trial Court's reduction of an attorney's fee, the trial 
:ourt had further articulated or found on admissible evi-
dence some equitable consideration, other than the bare 
amount of recovery, to justify the reduction of fees. The 
reduction of an attorney's fee based solely on the fact that 
13 
the fee sought approximated the amount of recover:i, howe' 
appears to be without precedent in Utah, 
It is the appellant's contention that the "' 
court's determination to reduce the appe 11 ant's at l<Jnrc 
fees on the grounds that the fees approximated the a~v 
lant' s recovery, should necessarily have been coupled 'wt':, 
specific articulated finding that the fees were unreasom•. 
or that other equitable considerations based on ac11111ss,c.-
evidence militated against the appellant and requirej 
reduction of the attorney's fee. Instead, the lower co•_;r:' 
award of the reduced attorney's fee is coupled "11th :-_, 
finding that the fee requested by the appellant was ·~" 
sonable and necessary. The appellant urges that this c .. -
hold that, absent some finding based on admissible ev1der..-
that the fee was unreasonable or that admissible equ1tar"' 
considerations justified a reduction, the trial court ~-~ 
not reduce an award of attorney's fees for the sole reas: 
that the fees otherwise requested would approximate •.:-
amount of recovery. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ONLY $1,500 
IN ATTORNEY'S FEES, AFTER THE APPELLANT 
SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED A $205,000 COUNTER CLAIM 
The respondent filed a counter-claim seek 
$205,000 in damages. The respondents alleged that the 
14 
«oh1•: ce ·.-1hich had been sold pursuant to notice, had been 
:: rncJ::ull~· repossessed, ar:d that the respondent Kirk Bracken 
,•,,d been damaged thereby. (R 43 ~'s 14, 15, 16) The res-
rcrdents additionally alleged punitive damages resulting 
~rom "an intent to vex, annoy, and harrass the defendants as 
e~:denced by the repossession (R 44 no) 
Clearly, the counter-claim challenged the appel-
~ 01:1t' eo r1;iht to repossess the vehicle under the facts as 
~_:,e·i existed at the time of the repossession. 
Before the trial Court, the respondent's attorney 
tried to mc.nimize the significance of the counter-claim by 
implying that the appellant's counsel should not have in-
:c..;:-;:ed a'.torney' s fc:es :n asserting its rights pursuant to 
u,e the security agreement to defend against it. Respon-
ients' counsel stated: 
Well, your Honor, the counter-claim was based on 
bad faith. Under the uniform commercial code, the 
Court has the power to award punitive damages and 
the j'ohn Deere case held exactly that. So that 
was the basis of the $205,000. We are dealing 
with a bank of the size of Dixie State Bank. 
I think Mr. Hughes knows, as well as I and 
the Court, that you plead more than you 
think you can get. ( T 14: 4-12, emphasis added) 
When questioned by Mr. Hughes, under oath, about 
che S205,000 counter-claim, Mr. Miles, respondents' attorney 
rest1fied: 
I think in my view, the $205, 000 claim was 
thing to give the bank a cause for concern, 
they would suggest a settlement and we 
resolve the matter. (T 32: 13-16) 
15 
some-
maybe 
would 
The appellant urges that it was entitled tc .. , 
ously defend against the counter-claim as r:lead ·,;itt: •. 
parameters of its note and security agreeme:1L. Ther~. 
requirement and indeed there should not be any reqUEe 11 " 
that the appellant di·nne the seriousness of t!:e 
claim or the responder. t' s intentions or reasons for 
posing the counter-claim. Indeed, pursuant to the prch.: 1 
tions of Rule 11, U.R.C.P., the appellant muse assu:n~ 
respondent's counter-claim was based on respondents' :· 
sel' s belief that there was good ground to support it 
stated in the rule: 
The signature 
ficate !:~· him 
to '.:he best 
belief, there 
that it is not 
of an attorney constitutes a =~-·­
th2.t he has 1:ead t:1>c: :-'.e.'1cLng 
of ~is knowledge, :..r:L1::;:-mat1cr. 
'..S good ground to su,:port it. 
interposed for delay . 
Thus, the appellant was entitled to take the counter-cl.1. 
~t face ·;alue, assume its gravity, and defend accordrnq 1 :· 
the enforcement of its contractual right der1·v·ed from 
security agreement to repossess and sell the collateral 
sue for a deficiency on the note. 
The respondents by their signed counter-cla1rn, :. 
$205, 000 in controversy. The appellant believes as heret 
fore stated, that this Court ought to consider all re:e.i: 
factors in addition to the amount in controversy in dete. 
mining its award of atttorney's fees. As stated above. 
Court ought to consider the equities in making its awa1 1 
that regarc!, this Court ought to soberly consider the :ee· 
dents' counsel's candid statement at trial that the counr· 
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claun was brought primarily to "give the bank cause for 
.. r,,.d n, maybe they ·,iould suggest settlement . . (T 32: 
'3- 1 ~ ) Certainly 1 t is not equitable to bring a $200, 000 
ounte:1-claim, merely for such a purpose and then complain 
when the defendant of the claim takes the matter seriously. 
It. is e·Jen less equitable to deny reasonable attorney's fees 
expended in defending a concededly overpled matter. 
It cannot be said that the lower court was unaware 
_f tne appellant's efforts to defend the $200,000 counter-
claim, when it awarded on $1,500 in attorney's fees. 
The following dialogue between ~he lower court and 
the appellant's counsel is instructive: 
Mr. Hughes: '{our Honor, may I ask if the Court is 
taking into account ~he fact that a $200,000 
counter-claim was filed against the bank here? 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Hughes: In making that attorney's fee? 
The Court: I made the ruling with respect to your 
work and what you were facing and whether or not 
it was reasonable. I have found your fees to be 
reasonable. 
Mr. Hughes: All right. 
The Court: 
findings. 
All right, now I want that in the 
Mr. Hughes: The Court then, is ruling that I 
should not have spent time in resisting the $200,000 
claim? 
The Court: Now, Mr. Hughes, it is clear that I 
have ruled that the time you put in, the fees you 
charged, and the instructions and work you did, 
was fair and reasonable in light of what you were 
facing. (T 39:18-40:9). 
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The lower court awarded only $1, 500 in a"tcr", 
fees after having found that the t1;ne spent by trcc: 
lant's counsel in defending a $205,000 counte1-c~ 3 L: 
reasonable and necessary. As mentioned above, the 
court's only explanation for its ruling was that the 
did not feel that it could award an attorney's fee ·.1r,; 
approximated the amount of recovery by the appellant. 
This Court then, is faced with the quest 1 :· 
whether the trial court may award a reduced attorne\·'s :•-
for the reason that an award of attorney's fees ought net 
approximate the amount of recovery in a case in •,ituch:. 
prevailing party also successfully defended a $205 
counter-claim, and the trial court has explicitly f0und 
the fees incurred in pursuing recovery were reas.;;nar., 
The appellant urges that the lower court errec 
CONCLUSION 
In awarding a substantially smaller attorney's 
than what the lower court found was otherwise reasonaD., 
the District Judge found that an award of attorney's i•o 
"must have some reasonable relationship to the amount t~,·. 
can be gained or whatever could potentially be lost·" 
34: 18-20) This appears to have been the lower coui 
guiding principle or condition. The impos1 t1on of S·J· 
condition on the appellant frustrates this court's pol'·· 
indemnification and prevents the trial court's balanclll'J 
weighing of other factors in determirnng 1 ts award, l1'' 
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! : fly, as here, repeated continuances by the respondent, 
_-,Tr,,crn'ied by Jury requests. There is no authority for such 
'"'Ht urn and it should not be sanctioned by this Court. 
It is apparent from the transcript of the pro-
,:e>0d::..ngs that the lower court felt uncomfortable with its 
'~.'Ol)J award of attorney's fees in light of the fact that 
,_he 3ppe 11 ant had also defended a $2 00, 000 counter-claim. 
7~a court, seeking direction, encouraged the parties to 
apreal the award. The appellant believes that the lower 
court's award of attorney's fees is also unreasonable in 
light of the appellants successful defense of a $200,000 
-.::cunter-clairn. Indeed, in light of both counsels' testimony 
·_;; 3t a g~·e,~ t2r fee was ::..n order, the reduction in fees does 
not stand ~p to appellate scrutiny in the transcript. As 
the trial court requested instruction and clarification of 
~he matter, so also does the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
;~ 
,/(/
11/,: / ! rG, )///) /_J.-•/ 
MIHAEL D. iIDGHES ~ / 
// 
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DALE R. CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Dixie State Bank 
'.<!AILING :::ERTIFI:::A.TE 
do heret;• cert.:.fy that ma1 led a tr~;: '· 
accurate copy of the fore going APPELLANT'S BRIEF, pos:,:, 
prevn::l '::: John M:les, cC North 3J'.l East, St. '.;eorge 
l983 . 
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